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CO-OPERATING IN A JOBLESS SOCIETY-
A STUDY IN GREATER TURTN 
In many western countries in recent years we have 
seen a renewal of interest in the phenomenon of the 
co-operative. This interest has been created by the spread 
of a co-operative movement which in some ways represents a 
departure from traditional models of co-operation. 
Three factors have often been mentioned as 
distinguishing the novelty of the phenomffnon (Stern, 1983; 
Sommer, 1984a, 1984b; Daudr and Sotto, 1985; Rei, 1985; 
Spear, 1985). The most important is seen as the process of 
de-industrialisation, which leads to an increase in the 
pool Of those who have been made unemployed from the 
centrai productive sectors of the economy. The expulsion of 
these core workers (garantiti) creates a number of people 
interested in the idea of co-operatives, who have resources 
of knowledge, trade skills, experience of life, and 
expectations and needs different from those who have 
traditionally been involved in setting up co-ops - whether 
these have been workers on the periphery of the economy, or 
whether they have been people closely involved in the 
established co-op area. The second factor is generally seen 
as the crisis in state welfare institutions - which opens 
up a space for locai community initiatives, mainly oriented 

towards the provision of social or welfare services. Thrs 
implies the growth of a service sector to go alongside the 
areas of production and distribution where co-operatives 
have more traditionally operated; and also the emergente of 
areas of activity which are funded by public bodies, and 
thus, at least to a certain extent, removed from a 
situation of pure market competition. The third factor 
finally, i s often seen as an increased ecological 
sensitivity of the younger generation, and, more in 
general, a desire to pursue in one's work alternative, 
post-materialistic values (Rotchild-Whi^t, 1979, 1981; 
Schnerder, 1985). In this third factor, elements of a 
culture with legitimating functions may be seen - in the 
sense that a fit is guaranteed between the ideology and the 
co-operative practice (Brown, 1985). 
These factors taken together are frequently taken to 
imply an idea which is not always made explicit: that there 
exist the pre-conditions for the growth of a sector which 
can establish itself as an alternative to the classical 
capitalist enterprise (Rotchild-Whitt, 1981; Bradley and 
Gelb, 1984 ) . 
We would argue however, that there are substantial 
reasons for suspecting that there is a strong element of 
wishful thinking here, especially as far as the potential 
for quantitative expansion is concerned. On the whole, the 

co-op revival seems a long way from being able to act as a 
credible solution to the problem oi protuem of the unemployment 
induced by technological progress. This would seem to be as 
true for the Italian regions affected by the problem as for 
other areas. Our investigations into the Province of Turin 
- which is well-known as being one of the provinces in 
Italy most affected by the expulsion of workers from the 
core sectors of the economy - have revealed no more than 
around forty co-ops formed in the last five years by 
workers made redundant, or by those who had a position on 
the fringes of the economy. Moreover, almost ali of these 
are small or very amali (20 members) , and many exist only 
on the drawing-board. 
The fact that this is, in quantative terms, a 
phenomenon of limited dimensxons, does not, however, 
detract from the sociologica! interest of investigating the 
constituent dynamics of the co-oPs which do exist, or of 
seeing what they are like and how they function. For this 
purpose, research was carried out on a sample of sixteen 
cases - sixteen co-operatives set up in the urban area of 
Turin in the wake of the employment crisis (1). The aim of 
the analysis was to suggest an interpretative model capable 
of explaining- the following: 

a) the choice of sector of activity and the level of 
commercial success; 
b) how the leadership gets its legitimation, and some of 
the ways in which it operates; 
O the prospectives for development in terms of the 
internai democracy-economic efficiency dilemma. 

theses of the research: mode of origin and 
historical specificity of the social environment 
To achieve the above research aims, a typology of 
the co-operatives examined will be drawn up, based on the 
way in which they originated. For the first thesis of the 
research is that a " longitudinal " perspective which brings 
out the circumstances in which the co-ops were founded, and 
the choices made by the founding members even before their 
officiai opening, provides certain important elements for 
understanding their subsequent developmentThis thesis may 
be seen as having certain links with the cultural approach 
which emphasises the life-cycle as a key concepì for the 
analysis of organisations (Pettigrew, 1979; Kimberly and 
Miles, 1980; Batstone, 1983; Zan, 1982; Allaire and 
Firsirotu, 1984). in particular, our thesis is dose to 
that adopted by Gherardi and Masiero (1985), who studied 
co-ops similar to those in our sample and proposed a 
distinction between co-operatives which were founded, and 
co-operatives which resulted from a coalition. In this 
typology, co-operatives which are founded take their 
impetus from the founding group itself, they are 
predominanti^ composed of ex shop-floor workers, they have 
a charismatic leadership, are instilled with egalitarian 
values and alternative working practices, have a high 
ideological-emotional commitment, operate via work 

delegateci by some organization, usually a public body, and 
usually have a small number of members. Co-operatives which 
result from a coalition receive their impetus from external 
sources (e.g. trade unions or parties), they are socially 
heterogeneous, have a technical leadership, are inspired 
mainly by the aim of saving jobs, have more of an 
instrumentai than an ideologica! orientation, accept a 
certain degree of division of labour based on competence, 
may take work delegated by public bodies, but also operate 
directly on the market, and usually have a medium to large 
number of members (50 to 200) . 
This typology describes a continuum which is fairly 
familiar in the sociology of organisations, and which 
recalls many of the themes present in Tonnies' classic 
Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dichotomy. An advantage of 
Gherardi and Masiero's distinction is that it does not 
conceive of the Gese1lschaft-tvoe structure as an 
evolutionary stage which necessarily establishes itself 
after an earlier Gemeinschaft phase, but rather argues that 
the two structures are already identif icable in the ways 
and forms in which the co-ops are set up. This perspective 
avoids the "conceptual nostalgia" (Zan 1982) of those 
organizational pessimists who, following Vienney (1966) and 
Meister (1971), assume that economie success in a 
co-operative implies an inevitable price in terms of a 
decline of democratic participation and of the initial 

charged emotional climate associated with the exciting 
early times (l^tat^nascente, . The dxstinction proposed 
by Gherardi and Masiero seems to us, however, toc rigid and 
deterministic, and it is difficult to understand up to what 
point it is the result of empxrical research, and to what 
extent it is a conceptual schematization, and hence a 
hypothesis yet to be verified. 
Various other approaches have been taken which have 
attempted to refute organizational pessimism. Numerous 
research projects have been undertaken to investigate the 
conditions which allow the maintenance of democratic models 
in co-operatives which have been commercially successful. 
We may limit ourselves here to mentioning Rotchild-Whitt•s 
study (1976), which identifies nine conditions for such 
maintenance of democratic participation. These are: 
a) a conception of the organization as being transitory; 
b) mutuai and self-criticism; 
c) limited dimensions and alternative growth patterns; 
d) being situated in a marginai sector of the economy; 
e) a widespread diffusion of technological knowledge; 
f) financial dependence on members; 
g) oppositional services and values; 
h) the existènce of a supportive professional base; 
i) an orientation consistent with a wider social movement. 
Other writers have lengthened this list and added 
other conditions, such as an aversion to hierarchical 

structures, or a widespread sense of collective property, 
or alternatively, have put forward different schema 
(Bernstein, 1976; Paton, 1978; Cornforth, 1985). On the 
whole, these approaches presuppose the study Qf a 
relatively long life cycle, so that diachronic analysis is 
possible, with, perhaps, return visits to the co-ops being 
studied. In our case, this was impossible, since the oldest 
co-ops in our sample were set up in 1978 or 1979, and the 
most recent were only a year, or in one case only a few 
months, old. This limitation, however, need not preclude 
the obtaining of significant research regnits, if - as we 
intend to do - one can demonstrate that the period of 
gestation, and the choices made when the co-op is founded, 
already provide an outline of its general characteristics. 
Our approach necessarily differs then, from the 
totally diachronic method of the life-cycle researchers, 
but is also distinct from the pre-determistic, almost 
"genetic" perspective of Gherardi and Masiero's model. Our 
working hypothesis is that the typology which distinguishes 
co-operatives according to the way and the form in which 
they are founded provides certain elements for an 
understanding, but that it cannot pretend to provide a 
comprehensive and internally coherent explanation of ali 
the relevant features of co-ops. 
The research's second thesis is that it is always 
necessary to bear in mind the specificity of the historical 

context into which co-operatives are born. The three 
conditions mentioned at the beginning of this article are 
present in the urban area of and around Turin. But the 
historical specificity of this area i s that the 
unemployment crisis which began in 1980 also set the seal 
on the collapse of the social movement which, throughout 
the preceeding decade, had been involved in a cycle of 
industriai and urban struggles which - i n terms of 
intensity, duration, millenarian overtones and capacity to 
ignore conventions and laws - was unique in the West (2). 
For thousands of people, the struggles.. of the '70s 
constituted a paradigmatic experience. As Mannheim (1951, 
P. 252) writes, paradigmatic experiences are those decisive 
and fundamental experiences whose imprint "is so deeply 
stamped onto our mind that it provides a mould into which 
other experiences flow. Thus, once formed, they give shape 
to more recent experiences". Our thesis is that the 
establishment of new co-operatives in the Turin area by 
workers made redundant or on the fringes of the economy, 
can only be adequately explained if one takes into account 
not only the rise in unemployment, but also the politicai, 
social and existential experience developed in over ten 
years of "the movement". This hypothesis leads one directly 
to ask the question: are those most involved in that 
experience more likely to form co-ops than those who had 
been less involved? And, if so, is the fact that they take 

part an extra guarantee of the maintenance of democracy? 
Further, what level of commercial success do they achieve, 
and how do they legitimize this? 
2" T h e movement of the 1970s and the origin of the 
co-operatives 
As Gerlach says (1976), a collective protest 
movement is always divided into various currents, always 
has many heads, and a complex mass of intepweaving threads. 
The movement of the 1970's was no exception and this gives 
us some clues to the phenomena we are studying. First of 
ali, we can understand that an ideological-political 
classification of our co-operatives is of little value. If 
interpreted in very general terms, the criterion of 
ideological Identification does not discriminate, because, 
with one exception, ali the co-ops in our sample were 
formed by people who had been, and stili were, active in 
trade unions, parties and other organizations within the 
broad area of the left. If taken in stricter terms, the 
same criterion is of little value for two reasons: the 
first is that in virtually ali the co-ops examined there 
was a wide range of ideological and politicai backgrounds 
among the members, and there is no point in counting up to 

see which current is in the majority, since none of the 
co-ops themselves do this. 
The second reason is that precisely because of the 
fractional, many-headed and intertwined nature of the 
movement, most members have more than one commitment: to 
union, party, small radicai group, or to some 
organizationally fluid area such as feminist, ecological or 
religious groupings. 
The second clue coming frora the '70s helps us to 
understand the social composition of the co-ops. Zan (1982) 
suggests a distinction can be made between worker co-ops -
which typically operate in the traditional industriai 
sectors of the economy - and youth co-ops, which tend to 
work in agriculture or in the service sector. This 
distinction is not suitable for our co-ops, since both 
workers and youths are often found together on the sanie 
project. Out of six co-ops set up on the initiative of 
ex-employees, five are open to young people on the fringes 
of the workforce who have not yet gained a secure position 
in the workforce; and out of six co-ops created to organize 
young people on the fringe of the economy, four have taken 
on individuals who until a few months previously, worked in 
factories. Four co-ops, finally, were mixed right from the 
start. 
The mixing of these two social categories is, we 
believe, to be explained, by the nature of the urban 

society which was formed in the struggles of the -70s. On 
the one hand, those who had a secare job in the core 
sectors and those who were on the fringes of the economy, 
or unemployed, shared the same experrences within the 
movement, collaborating and often clashing together. The 
spread of impermanent, insecure jobs (lavoro_jrecario) 
combined with the emergence of what has been called 
JJ operaio sociale (i.e. the worker who takes his identify 
from society and not just from work) had the effect of 
lessening the differences in the job conditions of the two 
categories. In 1978 the last wave of workers was taken on 
at FIAT and this meant that thousands of marginali -
workers hitherto without a place in the core sectors of 
industry - took on the role of a core worker (garantxto) , 
without however interiorizing this role (Belforte and 
Ciatti 1979; Marcenaro, 1979); and they were then kept on 
for too short a time for the experience to be more than a 
brief episode in their lives. (The mass redundancies 
started in the autumn of 1980). Work and non-work were thus 
intertwined in a situation which had characteristics of 
both the worker and the marginai at the same time (Barbano, 
1980). The rejection of this distinction explains why it 
would be artificial to make a distinction today between 
worker co-ops and youth co-ops. Moreover, even if one 
wanted to persist in this distinction, it would have less 
analytical value than other variables. In particular, it 

might be noted that co-ops made up predominante o f 
ex-core-sector workers operate in agriculture and the 
service sector, just as co-ops with a membership mainly of 
ex-marginals have successfully established themselves in 
industry. 
Having rejected classification on the basis of 
ideologica 1 identification or of social composition then, 
we propose another criterion for distinguishing individuai 
co-ops within our sample - based on the way in which they 
were founded. We put forward three categories: 
1) co-operatives created spontaneously; 
2) co-operatives created via impetus from outside 
institutions (aided); 
3) co-operatives created by the regalarization of an 
already existing work situation (federative). 
The spontaneous co-ops are set up on the initiative 
of a homogeneous founding nucleus, or even on that of a 
single leader who was capable of collecting other people 
around a pian. A common feature of this type is the 
presence of a group of friends and/or comrades which had 
been formed in previous homogenizing experiences at work, 
in politicai activism or in other, more general social 
experiences connected with a shared social condition. The 
aided co-ops are those where, even though members have 
shared experiences and in some cases a naturai leader of 

their group, the co-op would not have g o t off the ground if 
it had not been for the decisive interventi of an 
external body such as a union, one of the co-op 
associations, or occasionai^ the organistica of a party, 
in this category we include the so-called "inheriting" 
co-ops formed by some of the employees of f i r m s w h i c h h a v e 
closed or gene out of business, who have then decided to 
continue the business on their own. (Ali three inheriting 
co-ops in our sample made use of outside support). 
The federative co-ops finally, get together people who are 
already employed in black work or work which is insecure 
and impermanent, and who decade to organize together to 
improve their work situatici,. (This characteristic 
overrides in importance the spontaneity vs. aid dimension 
which these federative co-ops may display). 
3- M o d e of origin, date of foundation and sector of 
activity 
Plotting the mode of origin against the year in 
which our co-ops were set up, gives some initial results of 
interest (see table 1). 

Table 1 
Mode of origin and year of foundati 
2EÌ2ÌH 1978-80 1981-82 1983-85 
1 Spontaneous i 4 
Aided _ . 
1 6 
Federative 1 1 4 
Total 
6 
7 
3 
It can be seen that the aided co-operatives are on 
the whole signxficantly more recent than the spontaneous 
ones (even the one aided co-op founded ..in the period 
1981-82 in reality only started to function at the 
beginning of 1984). Taking 1980 as the beginning of the 
unemployment crisis, it may be inferred that the main 
initial reaction to the crrsis was spontaneous, whereas 
institutional intervention carne only later, when it was 
that the impetus from the grass-roots was 
insufficient. The federative co-ops, which bring together 
people who are already working in the area, grow up in 
circumstances which are independent of the rise in 
unemployment. 
We will examine later on the differential in 
resources required which allowed certain co-ops to be 
established spontaneously. For the moment, table 1 allows 
US to advance the initial general hypothesis (which would 
need to be tested in further research) that, in the face of 
an acute crisis in employment, there is first a market 

Phase i n t h e f i e l d o f c o _ o p e r a t l v e s w h i c h s t i m u l a t e s 
certain pioneers who have exceptional resources; and that 
there then follows a second, arded, phase, in whuch the 
institions guide and support cases with relatively fewer 
resources. The timing of the two phases may also be 
affected by the lack of an established locai traditaon of 
co-operatives, and a certain delay before institions adopt 
a policy of actively promoting co-ops. 
Looking at the relationship between mode of origin 
and sector of activity, we can see three things (table 2): 
a) there is a clear tendency for the spontaneous co-ops to 
establish themselves in different sectors; 
b) being aided is not in itself connected with any sector 
of activity (even though vice versa the majority of 
co-ops operating in the area of industriai production 
have an aided origin); 
O the federative co-ops seem to be limited to the service 
sector. 
Table 2 
Mode of origin and sector in which activity carried out 
° r Ì ? Ì " Services, Manufacturing Distribution 
agriculture 
Spontaneous 4 1 2 
Aided 3 4 
Federative 3 
T o t a l io 5 1 

The first of these results may be explained firstly 
by the fact that operating in the service sector (manual 
services, welfare and social services, agriculture and 
forestry) is in general easier and requires fewer initial 
resources than starting up in industry. The services 
undertaken are almost always carried out for locai 
government or public bodies, and here even a co-op without 
support from an institution and without much initial 
capital has few problems of access. This public market, 
access to which usually depends on the decision of some 
committee, is much easier to enter and much more 
controllable than the private market. This opportunity is 
reinforced by the growing tendency for locai government to 
contract out its duties in welfare and manual services. (In 
Italy, the Stemmati law - which sets limits to hiring by 
locai authorities - is also relevant here). A second 
explanation is to be found in the preferences of co-op 
members. These are young marginali who, as previous 
research has pointed out (e.g. Schneider; Zan, op. cit.) 
are more willing to become involved in ecological and 
post-industriai work; but the presence of former factory 
workers who urgently need to get another job without 
excessive re-training should not be forgotten, since the 
areas most open to them are precisely, manual services, 
work in agriculture and forestry, and certain simpler jobs. 
One co-op in the spontaneous category is a case apart: this 

is a consumer co-op, founded by some militants of the far 
left in the roaring years of factory struggles. These 
people set up, among other things, an alternative canteen, 
which was at first illegal, then carne to be tollerated 
alongside the officiai canteen. In changed times, the 
organizers of this project managed to convert their 
infringement into a business asset, and to found a co-op 
for the distribution of alternative foodstuffs acquired 
from other co-ops. 
The presence of four industriai co-ops among the six 
categorized as 'aided' can be explained: 
a) by the fact that a trade union or one of the co-op 
associations "piloted" the entry m t o the market of two 
co-ops, supporting them in part via the network of 
co-ops already in existence. In one case, a union (CISL) 
sat alongside ex FIAT employees in the negotiatrons with 
the finti over renting work premises and machinery; 
b) in two cases, by the fact that they are inheriting 
co-operatives, which have taken over part of the plant 
of the firms which have ceased business, continuing 
production at little more than craft levels of output. 
It should be noted that the presence in the aided 
group of co-ops operating in the service sector and in 
agriculture or forestry goes against what is the 
commonly-held idea that the institutions giving support to 
co-ops are uninterested in these types of projects. We 

might interpret this finding by supposing that when the 
aid-giving bodies are faced with the difficulties of 
starting up in manufacture, they are flexible enough to 
advise alternatives. We can cite an interesting case here 
of an inheriting co-op formed on the closure of an 
engineering firrn, which, after failing to establish itself 
in this field, was advised by CISL union officiala to set 
up in the area of manual services, and then to try later on 
to move up into land improvement. 
4- Costs and benefits of being a member 
It is a merit of the classi c studies of 
co-operatives (Cole, 1954; Meister and Desroche, 1955; 
Infield, 1955) that they make it clear that the motives for 
starting up are always a combination of instrumentai 
calculation and ethical commitment. 
The combination of these two motivations creates a 
new pattern of organizing work which has often been 
presented as an alternative to either private enterprise or 
bureaucratic state enterprise (among recent contributions 
on this theme see Rotchild-Whitt, 1979; Svensson, 1985). 
Naturally, the exact mix between the two motivations 
for taking part in co-ops varies, and also interacts with 
other factors such as the purpose of the co-op, social 

so 
To 
expectations, decision-making and delegata processes, and 
level of commercial success. 
Our hypothesis is that the mode of origin is al 
significantly associated with motive for taking part. 
test this hypothesis, however, it is not sufficient simply 
to ask members, either directly what their motives are, nor 
to ask questions designed to reveal motives indirectly. 
Certain parameters connected to the relationship between 
capital contributions and incentives can be measured 
relatively simply and these may be taken as indicating, 
albeit indirectly, motives for takung part. The analysis of 
internai dynamics which follows will then help us to 
understand what sodai significami is given in the various 
co-ops to the relationship between contributions and 
incentives. 
The first variable we need to examine here is the 
contribution asked for joining the co-op. This is of 
particular importance because it symbolically expresses the 
overall aims of the co-op. So we notice that, within our 
sample, this initial contribution varies from one which is 
virtually nominai to a maximum of two million Italian lira 
(ali the more substantial sums being paid in installments 
or deducted from wages earned within the co-op). We may 
also note that if we cross the one hundred thousand lira 
threshold there is a big jump to the next highest contribu-
tion, which is half a million lira. 

These sums required of new members vary so widely 
that one is immediately brought to ask whether we are not 
talking of qualutatively different types of co-operatives 
here, and if we look at the relationship between initial 
contribution and mode of origin (Table 3) this idea would 
indeed seem to find support. 
Table 3 
Mode of origin and initial financial contribuì: non 
requested 
0 r i g i n 100,000 Italian lira over 100,000 
or less 
Spontaneous 6 (4j 
A Ì d S d 2 (-) 5 (2) 
Federative 3 (2) 
T o t a l 1 1 ( 6 ) 5 ( 2 ; 
The figures in brackets indicate the number of co-ops in 
each category having a turnover of over 15 million lira per neaa m 1984. 
Ali the co-ops which have a spontaneous or federative 
origin fixed low or nominai, five of the seven aided co-ops 
high initial contributions. We might therefore hypothesize 
that low contributions for joining indicate an expressive 
orientation, where co-operation is seen as having social 
ends and as a form of expressive solidarity; whereas high 
contributions would indicate predominantly entrepreneurial 

a 
and economie aims. If this was true, we might expect a fit 
between level of economie investment, members" 
expectations, and mode of origin of the co-ops. So those 
that reguire only a low financial contribution would be 
offering primarily social and solidary benefits and 
precisely for this reason they could allow themselves 
spontaneous origin. Federative co-ops, on the other hand, 
would not need high initial contributions since their aim 
is simply to regularize work which already exists. Those 
co-ops which require a high sum for 3oining, in contrast, 
would be interested mainly in getting on -economically and 
creating jobs, and for this reason allow themselves to be 
guided towards this end by external bodies. 
To test this hypothesis we can look at the 
relationship between "initial contribution" and a variable 
which reflects level of commercial activity. The variable 
we chose was the ratio between the 1984 turnover and the 
number of full-time and part-time members working for the 
co-op in the same year. This relationship is also presented 
in Table 3; (the figures in brackets give the numbers of 
co-ops which, in 1984, had an annual turnover of more than 
15 million lira per head). 
It can be seen that the hypothesis outlined above is 
partly refuted and partly unproven (hypothesis nuli). It is 
refuted because four of the six spontaneous co-ops have an 
annual pro-capita turnover of over 15 million lira. These 

four co-ops, moreover, represent half the total of those 
with a turnover above this figure. Hence we can say that a 
low initial contribution does not necessarily imply r e s t i n g 
in a sort of pre-economic linbo of expressive solidarity. 
The low j oining fee is a politicai and symbolic decision 
which does not exclude other ways of financing the enter-
prise, such as voluntary loans from members, loans g i Ven 
out by locai government bodies (especially the regional 
administration) or loans from bodies which are providing 
the work. 
The relationship between initial contribution and 
turnover gives a nuli hypothesis with respect to the aided 
co-ops, since two of these are too recent for turnover to 
be calculated and no clear pattern can be seen in the other 
five. It is notable however that neither of the two aided 
co-ops with low contributions for joining reached the 15 
million threshold. 
These results need to be re-examined. If we set 
initial contribution against sector of activity, we can see 
that there is a very strong correlation between the service 
sector and low joining contributions and between 
manufacturing and high contributions (Table 4). 
The different level of initial investment required 
in the two sectors is obviously relevant here; and the 
lower cost of setting up in the service sector in its turn 
explains the preference of the spontaneous co-ops for 
entering this area. However the results shown in Table 4 
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Table 4 
Sector of activity and contribution requested 
S e C t Q r L. 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 or lfiss over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 
Services 9 ( 4 ) 1 
Manufacturing ! ( 1 ) 4 
Distribution 1 d ) 
T ° t a 1 n ( 5 ) 5 ( 2 ) 
The figures in brackets indicate the number of co-ops in 
each category having a turnover of over 15 "million lira per 
head in 1984. 
give us reason to believe that spontaneous origin also acts 
as an independent variable and is partially responsible for 
the relative success these co-operatives have in the 
service sector and elsewhere. It can be seen in fact that 
the only two co-ops with low joining contributions yet high 
turnover, and which operate in manufacturing or distribu-
tion, are spontaneous in origin. 
We can complement the economie aspects we have 
examined so far by analyzing how the chance of obtaining 
work varies in the three types of co-ops. Since this can be 
measured by the percentage of members of a co-op who 
worked full- or part-time for the co-op during 1984, it 

follows that the size of the organization is a cruciai 
variable (Table 5). 
Table 5 
Number of members and of those employed, by mode of origin 
Spontaneou s Aided Federative Total 
Average no.members 28.0 15.8 90 . 7 34.4 
Standard deviation 9.9 4.7 42.6 33.8 
Av.no. employed 14.7 5.4 47 . 6 16 . 8 
Standard deviation 12.8 6.2 - 2 6.1 21.1 
Employed as % total 
m e m b e r s 52.3% 34.2% 52.8% 48.8% 
Table 5 shows that: 
a) the largest co-ops are the federative ones - which can 
be explained by the fact that they organized workers who 
were already in work, albeit in jobs which were insecure 
and marginai (precari) . Next in size come the 
spontaneous co-ops with an average of 2 8 members, and 
lastly the aided co-ops with approximately 15 members. 
b) the probability of a co-op member obtaining work within 
the organization are virtually identical, at 52% and 53% 
of total membership, in the spontaneous and the 
federative co-ops. It should be remembered however that 
the spontaneous co-ops, unlike those with a federative 

origin, were starting from nothing. 
O the lowest chances of obtaining work are in the aided 
co-ops. It is true that there are two co-operatives in 
this group which had not yet got under way at the time 
the research was carried cut; but there were also three 
inheriting co-ops where ali the members had previously 
worked full- or part-time. (This lack of internai 
homogeneity is reflected in the hrgh standard devration 
value - higher than the average of the number of members 
obtaining work). 
The commercial data examined up to this point allow 
us to state an important preliminary conclusion: there is 
support for our hypothesrs that level of economie success 
within co-operatives is significante associated with their 
mode of origin. Co-ops set up spontaneously or via 
federation were on the whole more successful commercial^ 
and in providing jobs than were co-ops created with the 
impetus of outside aid. 
This finding poses an interpretative problem, since, 
baldly stated in this way, it might suggest that outside 
aid acts as a negative factor on development. However, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that the case is rather that 
the aided co-ops achieved less good results in spite of the 
aid they received, due to the internai dynamics which 
distinguish then. For the fact of being established thanks 
to external support is in itself a sign of their relative 

weakness when compared to co-ops which were able to 
establish themselves with their own resources. The next 
step in our analysis therefore consists of the attempt to 
shed some light on the varying internai conditions whrch 
can contribute to an explanation of differing levels of 
commercial success. We must however also give some 
attention to the reasons for the limits to external aid. 
5' T h e office of chairperson: sources of legitimation and 
reasons for the choice made 
Following various classic formulations (Selznick, 
1976; Gouldner, 1965), we assume as a working hypothesis 
that the nature and way of working of the leadership are 
the most important internai factors when we come to explain 
the degree of success reached by an institution in pursuit 
of its ends. In our sample, what we did in practice was to 
examine the reasons behind the choice of chairperson, and 
the ways in which the authority of this post was exercised. 
This operationa1 definition is justified for two 
reasons. The first is the almost total correspondence 
between actual leadership and formai office. In none of the 
cases examined do the real leaders work by delegating 
formai responsibility to others, and in only one case is 
the most prestigious leader not the chairperson but simply 

on the board of governors. The almost total overlap between 
actual leadership and formai responsibility conforms to the 
doublé "compliance" between norms and utilitarian ends 
which, according to Etzioni (1961) i s a feature of 
co-operative forms of association. The second reason is 
that in most of the co-ops there is considerable continuity 
over time in the leadership. In three cases there has been 
a change of chairman since the co-op's foundation, but in 
only one case was this due to internai conflicts which 
de-legitimated the founding chairperson. In six co-ops 
there has been some rotation of members on..the management 
committee, but here too, only in one case is this connected 
to internai conflicts. 
In analyses of leadership, a distinction has 
traditionally been made between charismatic (or 
expressive), and technical (or instrumentai) leaders. 
Charismatic leaders are those who have "diffuse" influence 
and prestige and who express the collective identify of the 
group apart. from any specific competence they may have. 
Technical leaders are those who derive their legitimacy 
from the recognised possession of specific skills and or 
their control over specific resources (Bennis, 1959; 
Etzioni, 1916). This distinction has been widely disputed 
in studies of leadership (e.g. Gouldner, 1965), and does 
not seem to be satisfactory in our case. For one thing, the 
criteria for establishing whether or not charisma is 

present are toc vague and unmeasurable. Secondly, the 
concept of charisma (even as redefined by Etzioni, 1961) 
does not distinguish the quality itself from the 
circurastances in which it originates Thirdly, the 
technical-instrumentai qualities of a leader are often the 
precondition for the development of a charismatic "aura". 
A more fruitful approach would seem to be to 
investigate the reasons underlying the choice of a 
particular chairperson. Since the co-operatives at this 
stage have obviously not been set up, the reasons for any 
choice must necessarily lie in the leadership qualities 
which are seen as deriving from past experiences and roles 
held. In spite of some difficulties created by the great 
variety in the co-ops1 particular histories, it was 
possible to outline the following typology of reasons 
behind the choice of chairman: 
1• Informai prominence in "the movement" 
These are individuals who, during the years of social 
agitation, acquired a diffuse influence as opinion 
makers in homogeneous groups of activists. This 
influence did not necessarily lead to formai positions 
(such as ' factory delegate or member of union 
leadership), and in any case having occupied positions 
of this type did not in itself have any influence on the 
nomination for chair. In these cases, the whole group 

took an active part in setting up the co-op and the 
choice of chairperson sets the seal on the diffuse 
recognition of the naturai gifts of the traditional 
leader of the group. 
Symbolic or institutional value of other posts held 
These are individuale who, prior to the establishment of 
the co-op had held formai positions which have a 
symbolic value; or individuals who stili held 
institutional roles outside the co-ops. These latter may 
be divided into two sub-types: 
a) individuals who held positions of authority in the 
firms which collapsed, and who enjoy a greater 
prestige due to this former position at work (e.g. 
middle management or white-collar workers). There is 
often here a feeling of gratitude on the part of the 
blue-collar group to a non-worker who has joined the 
co-op (a gratitude which should be distinguished 
from any recognition of technical skills); 
>) individuals who had an institutionalised role of 
union representative in the factories which closed 
(or within the group of workers laid off); 
) individuals working in locai organisations concerned 
with the encouragement of co-operatives (e.g. 
unions, leagues of co-ops) who continue to identify 
themselves primarily with these bodies. 

Note that these three sub-groups were combined in our 
research on account of the smallness of the sample. 
3- Altruistic entrepreneurial vocation 
These are individuals who normally operate in fringe 
social environments with the aim of organizing groups of 
young people in co-operative projects. Their 
ethical-ideologicai motivation (which is often of a 
religione nature) leads them to undertake intense 
entrepreneurial activity, which is not, however, aimed 
at personal gain. Often these leaders cojpmit themselves 
to a number of projects, to which they continue to act 
as expert advisors from outside even after the formai 
management positions have been taken over by individuals 
who have gained experience within the framework set up 
by the 'entrepreneur'. In its purest forms, the practice 
of this kind of entrepreneurship may be seen as a 
genuine form of religious action in the economie sphere. 
4 * Technical skills and control over resources 
These are individuals who - due to specific technical 
skills - are seen as being able to provide ideas as to 
how a co-operative should develop, or to provide or 
manage resources as efficiently as possible. 

5• Simple availability 
These chairpersons are not real leaders, having been 
nominated simply through the lack of other candidates, 
and because they have time available, have "plenty of 
enthusiasm", are generally honest, etc. 
This typology presente ideal-types, and there were 
some problems in fitting the particular cases of our sample 
to the various categories. In difficult cases we made 
further enquiries among our informants to find out what 
meaning had been given to the choice of chairperson. 
The relationship between reasons for choice of 
chairperson and mode of origin of the co-op (Table 6) 
furnish some points worth noting. Firstly, there is a 
consistent and significant association between: spontaneous 
co-ops and former informai leaders or altruistic entre-
preneurs; aided co-ops and institutional-symbolic leaders; 
federative co-ops and technical leaders. 
Table 6 Reasons for choice of chairperson and mode of origin 
Spontaneous Aided Federative Total 
Chairperson because of: 
activism in movement 3* - _ 3 
symbolic institutio-
nal value ~ 1* 5* _ g 
altruistic entrepre-
neurship 2 - _ 2 
technical skills - 1 3 4 
simple availability - 1 _ 3 
* The data refer to the time of the co-ops foundation. The asterisks 
show replacements by chairmen chosen later on for technical skills 
(each asterisk representing one such replacement). 
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Secondly, and more interestingly, the chairpersons 
chosen for their informai prominence in the scorai movement 
of the seventies are not at ali numerous (only 3 cut of 16) 
if one considers that most of the co-ops examined were set 
up in the wake of the collapse of the movement. This gives 
little support to the "romantic" hypothesis that sees the 
spontaneous leaders of the struggles as having being able 
to creatively transform their talent for organising 
oppositional politica into social entrepre^neurship. Those 
who set themselves on this path are the exception, and it 
cannot be taken for granted that they will __succeed (as is 
shown by the replacement of one leader of this type by a 
technical leader). 
This scepticism is indirectly confirmed by the 
strong association between aided co-ops and 
institutional-symbolic chairman. It might be objected that 
the nomination of former union representatives as chair-
persons does not refute the hypothesis of widespread entre-
preneurial potential within the movement: one might say 
that if these people had managerial talents, they had 
already had the opportunity to show this by taking on 
formai posts in the factory. However such posts are 
no guarantee" of economie entrepreneurial talent, and in 
fact the co-ops which they lead have difficulty in 
taking off in spite of external aid. 

A third observation may be made regarding the 
technical leaders. These are concentrated almost 
exclusively in the federative co-ops at the time of the 
co-ops' foundation, but later on they appear in some of the 
others, in both the spontaneous and the aided types. This 
fits the now well-established observations on the 
"life-cycle" of co-ops, which after an initial, primarily 
solidaristic phase, are seen to be concerned with economie 
aims (Zan, 1982) . 
To conclude this aspect of the investigation, we 
stili needed to see what direct connections there were 
between reasons for choice of chairman and commercial 
success. We therefore took the current chairpersons - who 
included three more technical leaders than there had been 
when the co-ops were founded - and we examined their 
relationship with the distribution of co-ops under or over 
the 15 million lira turnover level (see Table 7) . The 
results we obtained were consistent with the rest of our 
results, since they confirm that the higher turnover co-ops 
were led predominantly by technical leaders or altruistic 
entrepreneurs, whereas the institutional-symbolic leaders 
are concentrated in those co-ops which have a lower turn-
over (where we also find the one chairperson chosen for 
simple availability). In the low turnover category there 
are also three technical chairpersons, but two of these are 
recent arrivals so we ought to suspend judgement on their 

performance. As far as the former informai 
seems necessarily either 
movement leaders 
are concerned, these do not 
successful or unsuccessful. 
Table 7 
Reasons for choice of present chai rperson and level of 
output per head 1984 
Output up to Output over Total 
15 million lira 15 million lira 
Chairperson because of: 
activism in movement i 
symbolic institutio-
nal value 3 
altruistic entrepre-
neurship 
technical skills 3 
simple availability 1 
T o t a l q 
2 2 
4 7 
1 
8 16 
6- The chairpersonship: degree of commitment 
The results obtained above pose some problems of 
interpretation. It would be easy to conclude that the 
degree of commercial success is directly linked to the type 

Of Chairperson; but this conclusion risks being 
tautologica!. To avoid this danger, it is necessary to 
investigate further what the chairperson does and how he 
does it. The raost reliable datum we have for this purpose 
is the quantity of hours devoted to the work of chairperson 
(it may be noted that there is a strong correlation between 
time spent by the chairperson and time spent by other 
members of the management committee). The choice of this 
variable is based on the assumption that it is a good 
indicator not only of the general commitment of the 
chairperson but also of the social climate-existing within 
the various co-ops. For work in the running of the co-ops 
which is voluntary or paid at cost price is a common 
feature in this type of body, although this varies from one 
organization to another. This may be seen as an expression 
of the "degree of moral tension that is associated with the 
persistence of utopian aspirations" (Tacchi, 1977, p. 120) 
and may also be seen as an expression of the degree to 
which the chairman identifies with his co-op. 
We cannot discount the possibility, however, that 
other factors influence the amount of time devoted to the 
office of chairperson - for example, the sector in which 
the co-op operates, its size, or its date of foundation 
(given that it is reasonable to suppose that the total of 
hours will be greater in the founding phase than when the 
co-op has got going) . Now, in our sample, there are eight 

co-ops where the chairperson spends over 30 hours a week, 
five where she/he spends 15-30, and three where she/he 
spends less than 15. This considerable variation does not 
seem to be significantly associated, however, with sector 
of activity, size, or date of foundation. 
Heavily and lightly committed chairpersons exist in 
ali sectors of activity. In three out of four of the larger 
co-ops, the chairpersons spend more than 30 hours, but 
there seems to be no pattern to the amount of time spent in 
small or medium-sized enterprises. And although in five of 
the eight newest co-ops the chairperson -devotes over 30 
hours a week to his post, in the other three new ones s/he 
puts in less than 15 hours. (Tables not given). This 
negative result betrays the existence of other variables 
linked to the type of co-op and to the type of chairperson. 
So the relationship between time spent by 
chairperson and mode of origin (Table 8), and reasons for 
choice of chairperson (Table 9) provide a more interesting 
picture. Table 8 shows that the spontaneous, and the 
federative co-ops ali have chairmen who put in a high or 
medium number of hours, whereas in the aided co-ops, 
chairmen working low or medium amounts of hours 
predominate. 

Table 8 
Mode of origin and time commitment of chairperson 
Origin 
spontaneous 
aided 
federative 
T o t a l 
average weekly hours worked 
up to 15 hours 16 to 30 hours over 30 hours 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
Table 9 
Reasons for choice of present chairperson and time 
put in by chairperson 
up to 15 hours 16 to 30 hours over 30 hours 
Chairperson because of: 
activism in 
movement 
symbolic or insti-
tutional value 
altruistic entre-
preneurship 
technical skills 
simple availability 
T o t a l 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
Table 9 shows, a) that a high number of hours is 
typical of ex-movement chairpersons and most of the 

technical chairpersons; b) that a low number of hours is 
associated with institutional-symbolic chairmen, although 
it is also a feature of some technical chairmen. 
Examined together, these two tables allow us to 
assume that in the spontaneous and the federative co-ops 
the chairman is the organic expression of the founding 
group, and it is naturai for him to identify with the fate 
of the co-op, which he experiences as his own creation. 
This is true both for the ex-movement chairpersons and for 
those chosen for their technical skills. The lower time 
commitment found in the aided co-ops might be due to a lack 
of entrepreneurial vocation as such, or to a more detached 
approach which saw the chair of the co-op as one commitment 
among many others rather than as a mission. This second 
possibility also seems to fit the case of the three 
technical chairpersons who were elected some time after the 
initial foundation of the co-op. Ali three of these said 
they saw their position as a normal job, and maintained 
that their legitimation ought to come from the results they 
achieved rather than from the time they spent at the co-op 
offices. 
We might ask here whether the quantity of time put 
in by the chairperson is significantly associated with the 
commercial results achieved. Table 10 shows clearly that it 
is: in ali the co-ops with an annual turnover of over 15 
million lira per head, the chairpersons put in over 15 

hours a week, and vice versa, in half of the low turnover 
organizations, they put in less than 15 hours. However, 
this connection should not be read in simple causai terms, 
as if the amount of hours put in was, by itself, capable of 
determining the level of commendai success. We should 
assume rather that there is an interaction between the two 
variables, for the number of hours expended on running the 
co-op will also depend on what phase of its life-cycle it 
is in, 
Table 10 
Time commitment of chairperson and level of output 
head 1984 
Average weekly hours worked 
up to 15 hours over 15 hours 
Output per head: 
up to 15 million lira 4 4 
over 15 million lira - 8 
T o t a l 4 . 2 
Concluding this section, we can say that we have a 
picture of commercial success in the co-ops which is both 
clear and consistent. Two factors stand out. The first is 
the organizational and situational logie of the co-ops 

deriving from the circumstances in which they were founded-
the second, the various individuai characteristucs of the 
leaders. There is no exact, predetermined correspondence 
between these two factors; the interaction between them 
creates a variety of situations, each with its specific 
problems and prospects. 
Spontaneity emerges as a condition which is 
potentially favourable to commercial success. However, this 
is only realizable if the spontaneous mode of development 
is guided by the presence of a leader - whether he be 
technical or altruistic-entrepreneurial (both of which 
types have in common technical competence). The aided 
co-ops, for their part, find themselves in the somewhat 
paradoxical position that, in order to take off they would 
need to overcome the handicap of the very fact of being 
aided. For aid usually leads to the appointment of 
institutional-symbolic leaders, who are good at reinforcing 
the collective identity of the members but do not 
necessarily possess business ability. The only feasible 
strategy for these co-ops seems to be to take on technical 
leaders - the strategy which those co-ops we have termed 
federative followed from the start. However, the problem is 
not a simple òne since business skills usable in the co-op 
sector are rare, and cannot be created solely by the 
existence of financial aid. One solution would be to 
replace the current system of "spontaneous aid" offered by 

voluntary bodies on a chance basis or on the basis of 
pre-existing links, with a definite policy for the 
encouragement of co-ops and the planning of their 
resources. Looking at things in this way, only the 
chargeover from spontaneous aid to planned aid would be 
capable of creating favourable preconditions for 
spontaneous development of co-operative initiatives. 
Laudable results in this direction have been achieved in 
other European countries, although it should be said that 
these countries have long-established systems of 
corporatist negotiation between business and_unions (among 
the most recent contributions, cf. for Austria, Schneider, 
1985; for Sweden, Stryjan and Hellmark, 1985; and for 
Denmark, Tetzschner, 1985) . 
7' Guaranteeing democracy - a matter of organization 
culture 
Let us examine now the question of internai 
democracy. First a preliminary problem: when estimating the 
degree of democracy existing in any institution, it is a 
good rule to àsk the rank and file. However, our resources 
did not permit this, and so the only evidence available to 
us consisted of various officiai documents, and interviews 
with managers. Ali the officiai documents (with one 
exception which will be mentioned below) give indications 
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Which are toc vague to for, the basis for judgements on the 
degree of democracy. The constxtutions do not make 
stimulating reading; and rotation of posts is not in itself 
evidence of any structural feature, and is in any case 
limited. Only the freguency of general assemblies gives 
some modest information. In the federative co-ops, these 
are rarer (2 or 3 times a year) than in the other 
types, but they are also more formalized. It seems 
reasonable however, to assume that this difference is 
linked to size since, as was mentioned above, the 
federative co-ops are much bigger than the .others (3). In 
the smaller co-ops, quite apart from any other 
characteristics they may have, assemblies are more 
frequent, but also less formalized, so that members may not 
always perceive the difference between a general assembly 
and a meeting of the management committee which is open 
to ali co-op members who wish to take part (cf. Zan, 1985). 
There is another type of officiai document which is 
more useful for our purposes, although only five co-ops 
have drawn these up. This is a declaration of intent, a 
sort of Magna Carta which backs up the founding 
constitution and which outlines the ideological and 
politicai positions which inspire the co-op. The common 
feature of ali five documents is the emphasis on safeguards 
of democracy, which in two cases goe so far as to make a 
unanimous vote obligatory for important issues, and in 

another case allows for a strike of the members. This i s 
justified as a safeguard against the risk of an excess of 
self-exploitation. This last concept is one that also 
inspires the other documents, along with the awareness of 
wanting to be "islands of socialism" in an environment 
which is unyieldingly capitalist and competitive. These 
documents may be considered declarations of the values on 
which the most movement-influenced members of the politicai 
movement of the 1970s tried to base their actions. However, 
it would be a mistake to consider them simply as 
"indeterminate abstractions" (Selznick) with the function 
of legitimating the actions of the leadership. We believe 
they ought to be seen as an expression of a specific 
organizational culture, and hence as convincing evidence of 
the high degree of normative compliance which members are 
bound by, and which protects them. 
The contents of these charters crop up again in the 
verbal statements of the chairpersons we interviewed. In 
contrast, it may be noted that in the co-ops which had not 
drawn up documents of this type, the chairperson expressed 
fewer worries about explicit safeguards and put more 
emphasis on the need to maintain and reinforce consensus 
via the pursuit of commercial aims. On the whole, the 
statements of the chairpersons can be placed along a 
continuum which goes from one extreme where democracy is 
viewed as something which should be safeguarded with 

the sanction of the obligatory unanimous vote, to the other 
extreme where democracy is seen as just one aim and value 
to be pursued among others. It should be said again that 
this classification is not in itself direct evidence of 
democracy actually being practiced, but it is evidence of 
how sensitive the organizational culture is to the 
principle of guaranteeing participatory democracy. 
Cornforth (1985) suggests a typology for measuring 
internai democracy within co-operatives which is based on 
the interelationship between two parameters, one concerning 
institutional aims, the other the types of control 
employed. On the institutional aims axis, he distinguishes 
between co-operatives which give priority a) to the need of 
workers to obtain work; b) to the pursuit of external 
social values; c) to the pursuit of commercial ends on the 
market. The first of these types is inspired by the values 
of the traditional left, the second is supposed to be 
ecological, and the third conservative in its orientation. 
This classification may be useful for a very large 
sample, but it is not suitable for our case where, as we 
have pointed out, the most cruciai differences centre on 
the existence or absence of safeguards of democracy. 
However the second dimension of Cornforth's typology 
provides us with some useful cues. Cornforth makes a 
distinction between: a) collective control; b) dual 
control; and c) managerial control. In the co-ops with 

collective control, ali important decrsions are taken by 
the assembly of members and although the remaining 
decisione are delegated to management, these can be 
overturned. In the co-ops where there is dual control, a 
democratic rank and file system co-exists with a managerial 
system, neither of the two components dominates the other 
and decisions are taken via an interplay of the two 
systems. In the co-ops where there is managerial control 
finally, management takes the important decisions and the 
assembly exercises a very general control only, even though 
its formai powers may appear extensive. 
A similar criterion may be applied to our co-ops, 
stili hearing in mind that the distinctions we propose are 
based on statements made by the management. So we can see 
that: A) five co-ops are based on a strong version of the 
safeguards principle: unanimous vote on important 
decisions, Constant involvement of members, marked 
egalitarianism, right to strike internally, assertion of 
the principle that "no one individuai is to blame, because 
responsibility is always collective", and suspicion of 
bureaucratic formalization. In some cases work has been 
refused because a minority of members was opposed in the 
assembly, and "co-op unity is more important than some 
temporary job which risks splitting us" . B) Eight co-ops 
might be defined as having a system of consultative 
democracy in the sense of being governed by the interplay 

outlined by Cornforth. The statement which best illustrates 
this type is: "we talk things over a lot and then we vote. 
If I (viz. the chairman) have got the majority, I g o ahead 
with what I have proposed, but if i'm i n t h e m i n o r i t y j 
withdraw my proposition and the matter stops there". C) 
Three co-ops are more centralized and the rank and file are 
usually only called in to ratify decisions. The chair of 
one of these co-ops says: "it's me that looks for work but 
I don't teli the members until the contract is certain so 
as not to raise false hopes". 
We will cali the variable in - question here 
"decision-making model" (4). Its relationships with mode of 
origin are given in Table 11. This table shows three main 
associations: - between spontaneous origin and 
unanimous-vote model; between federative origin and 
consultative model; and between aided origin and 
consultative model. These results are what we would expect 
given our theoretical perspective. The presence of two 
aided co-ops using the centralised model was also 
predictable, as the general imbalance of technical skills 
within the co-op may be seen as the factor which leads the 
rank and file to trust the management and delegate most of 
their powers to them. 

Table 11 
Mode of origin and decision-making model 
0 r i 9 i n unanimous-vote consultative managerial 
spontaneous 4 3 ^ 
aided 1 4 2 
federative - 3 
T o t a l 5 « 
Let us see now if we can also explain the anomalous 
cases - the spontaneous co-op with a centralised model, and 
the aided co-op with a unanimous-vote model. The first is 
directed by an altruistic entrepreneur who, as he puts it, 
does educational work by involving the members; the 
members, however, for their part maintain an instrumentai 
attitude, which leads them to delegate. In this way, a 
relationship with paternalistic overtones has been 
established, and also accepted. The spontaneity of the 
origin of this organization was something which concerned 
the founding leader more than anyone else, whereas people 
who were looking for work went along with the idea, without 
being especially concerned about taking part in 
decision-making. 
The members of this co-op (which is situated in a 
village in the Province of Turin) did not take part in the 
struggles of the movement, even though they agreed in 

principle. The second co-op has the opposxte 
characteristics. Its founding nucleus is made up of 
laid-off workers who were politicised in the seventies, and 
are very concerned with safeguards of democratic structures 
and the demanda of the rank and file. However their 
lack of managerial business ability led them to accept the 
proposals for development put forward by a union officiai 
who became their chairman. This man rigorously respects 
their participatory values, but so far the co-op has 
achieved little. 
On the whole, the course taken by the-co-ops so far 
seems to give support to the idea that the paradigmatic 
experience of the 1970s produced a very marked concern with 
the values of participatory democracy, but did not create 
the basis for a development of entrepreneurial potential. 
This contradiction remains in most of our co-ops, where the 
business ability of the managers does not seem to be 
connected to the intensity of their participation in the 
movement, but to naturai talent or to other experiences in 
their lives (so some former movement leaders are now 
"genning themselves up" by attending management courses). 

8- Commercial success and i n ^ r n ^ 
The decision-making model is an appropriate 
indicator of the extent of internai democracy but it tells 
us nothing about the structural conditions which favour or 
hinder the development of democracy. Rotchild-Whitt • s 
approach (1976) mentioned above, on the other hand, is 
intended to illuminate just this. 
Rotchild-Whitt puts forward nine factors encouraging 
participatory democracy. Four of these are cultural and 
normative: a conception of the organistica as being 
transitory, extensive self-criticism, values which are 
alternative to the dominant ones, orientation which fits in 
with a wider social movement. The first of these conditions 
does not seem to be either relevant or capable of 
discriminating between the co-ops of our sample, since 
fourteen out of sixteen say they want their choice to be a 
permanent one, and some of those interviewed maintained 
that it was a matter of a style of life. The sense of the 
challenge of going down a new road, amazement at results 
attained, and the fear that these may be lost ali crop up 
in the interviews with virtually ali the managers we talked 
to. In only two co-ops - both of which perform manual 
services - is there any tendency to consider the experience 
individuai members as transitory. The remaining 
normative or cultural conditions suggested by 

Rotchild-Whitt have already been discussed above. 
The other five conditions of the list are strategie 
or structural: maintenance of restricted dimensions, 
situation in marginai sectors of the economy, diffusion of 
specialist knowledge, development of skill and 
professionalism, financial dependence of the co-op on the 
members themselves. These are ali conditions which are 
present in varying degrees in our co-ops, and we examined 
each of them to see what their relationship was to the 
decision-making model, taken as the dependent variable. 
The results are largely negative,- since ali the 
tables of relationships except for one produce random 
associations (tables not given). The one significant 
association is that between decision-making model and the 
economie sector the co-op operates in. If we assume that 
services are more marginai and/or more alternative than 
manufacturing, it may be noted that the co-ops with a 
unanimous-vote model are concentrated in the service 
sector, whereas those with consultative or managerial 
models are more common in manufacturing. However this 
result is influenced by another, prior variable, since we 
have seen that spontaneous co-ops tend to choose the 
service sector, which is easier for them; but it is 
precisely the spontaneous co-ops which are most likely to 
have a unanimous-vote model of democracy. This result then, 
emphasises the importance of the variable we term "mode of 

origin". 
Can we conclude then, that the RotchiId-Whitt model 
should be got rid of? No, this would be hasty for two 
reasons. The first is that it requires testing on a much 
more heterogeneous sample than ours; it is obvious that our 
co-ops have a very considerable homogeneity, given the 
closely confined limits of space and time in which the 
research was conducted (ali the co-ops are influenced by 
the historically specific conditions of the 1970s, and we 
limit ourselves to illuminating the difterential effect of 
that "paradigmatic experience") . It seema reasonable to 
assume that the hypotheses contained in Rotchild-Whitt's 
model might be supported if a more heterogeneous sample was 
taken, especially if it was one containing co-operatives 
which had an average life cycle which was longer than ours. 
In this case the chances of finding a decline in democracy 
in some of the co-ops would increase, and it might be 
possible to link these to a decline in the conditions 
listed in the model. 
The second reason for not rejecting the 
Rotchild-Whitt model is that it can be seen as an 
invitation to look at the question of co-op democracy in 
terms of substance rather than simply of form. The 
strategie and structural conditions suggested in the model 
as the basis for democracy are also plainly management 
choices aimed at finding a form of commercial success 

suitable for an alternative form of enterprxse. Looking at 
things in this way, we might recali the Marxist idea that 
the foundatron of democracy is freedom from want, from 
insecurity, from unemployment, and so on; and that only 
given this basis does democracy in the sense of freedom of 
speech, of participation, or of dissent become relevant 
(5) . 
New if we assume that co-operatives actions are 
typically oriented towards commercial success so that they 
can ensure that members have jobs, and that this is the 
necessary basis for even talking about internai democracy, 
our problem becomes that of investigating what our co-ops 
decided to aim at, given the resources available, and what 
internai problema they had to face in consequence. (We say 
"internai problema" because external problems are already 
contained in the setting of aims). An assessment of 
resources has already been made in general terms when the 
distinction by mode of origin was introduced. It was seen 
that the spontaneous co-ops on the whole had a more 
favourable ratio of resources to objectives than the aided 
co-ops did (even the selection of objectives which are 
attainable with few hard resources is the product of a soft 
resource, namèly entrepreneurial knowledge). We also saw 
that the co-ops created via federation were in a different 
situation initially, since they did not have to find work 
to begin with, but only to organize it. 

Let us look now at the aims of the co-ops at the 
time of the research. These may be grouped in three 
categories. The first includes the axms of guantitatrve 
expansion: plans to increase output and jobs in fields 
where a co-op is already operating. The second covers 
qualitative changes of the field of work, and more 
generally, diversification. The third category finally, 
covers the objectives connected with starting up or with 
survival: agreements with other co-ops, or with public 
bodies, finding a surtable site, training courses etc.. 
Seen in the abstract, these aims might be -thought to be 
covered by the other two categories, but what counts is the 
meaning of the action in the circumstances: it is one thing 
to launch plans to expand or diversify the work carried out 
and quite another thing to launch plans to guarantee 
survival, or simply to get the co-op into operation. 
The relationship between objectives and mode of 
origin is shown in Table 12. Moving up into a better field 
of work is an aim expressed by as many as nine enterprises, 
belonging to ali three modes of origin, but usually working 
in the field of manual services. Some examples of these 
plans are: to manage a boat-hire establishment which would 
be contracted"out by the city administration, change from 
cleaning work to pottery or knitwear manufacture, to start 
up a half-way house for ex-drug addicts, and to improve 
husbandry by irrigation and earth-moving. 

Table 12 
Mode of origin and strategie aims 
Origin 
spontaneous 
aided 
federative 
T o t a l 
Quantitative 
expansion 
Moving to better 
paid field, 
diversification 
3 
3 
3 
Ensuring 
survival 
These plans fili two complementary needs: that of 
offering members better work and that of improving the 
co-ops' market situation. For several co-ops which 
developed well under the sheltered greenhouse of agreements 
with locai government bodies controlied by the left are 
starting to pose themselves the problem of equipping 
themselves to operate also on the private market. They feel 
the danger that locai government contracts may decrease 
because the balance of politicai forces has changed in the 
locai elections of May 1985. 

9. Conclusion: some dilemmas 
The last sub ject we will tackle is that of t 
relationship between mode of origin and internai proble 
(Table 13). The results obtained invite us to reflect 
some unresolved dilemmas in co-operative practxce and th 
are a suitable point to end our research. 
Table 13 
Mode of origin and internai problems 
No acute problems Defining roles, Resistance to 
increasing co-operative 
efficiency mentality 
spontaneous 
aided 
federative 
T o t a l 
1 
2 
3 
3 
1 
1 
5 
3 
5 
8 
The first finding is that three co-ops do not 
perceive acute problems. Ali three of these have technical 
leaderships, two are federative and one is aided - one of 
only two afded co-ops to have had a certain measure of 
success. The basis of their relative tranquility is to be 
sought in high economie standards and in the moderate and 
pragmatic nature of the participatory democracy practised. 

However, there is a powerful sub3ective element in the 
factors responsible for this situation and it is not 
ingenuous to suggest that the absence of problema here 
derives in substantial part from the relatively 
unproblematic personalità of the members. One question 
remains for the researcher however: is it just possxble 
that the most successful co-ops are also necessarily those 
which are least interesting? 
Five co-ops perceive acute problema with the 
redefinition of tasks in running the organization, the 
f ormai ization of Drocpdiirp? proceaures, and an xncreased 
rationalization of resources. These problems spring from 
previous success, but the spirit in which they are faced 
varies according to the mode of origin. In the federative 
and the aided co-ops, formalizing roles, procedures and 
control is seen positively as an act of growth and as 
guaranteeing efficiency and seriousness. In spontaneous 
co-ops, formaiization is experienced with ambivalence and 
viewed as a cost which may be necessary but one which is 
dangerous for the communitarian spirit. Once again we come 
up against the identity-interests dilemma which the 
sociology of co-operatives has by now well established. 
A more" interesting finding is the high number of 
organizations which complain of problems connected with a 
lack of co-operative mentality. This is a heterogeneous 
category since it includes: 

- individualistic and short-term demands which ignore 
social constraints; 
- low level of interest in running the co-op and in 
collective responsibility; 
- demands for safe work and refusai to take business 
risks; 
in the inheriting co-ops, persisterne through inertia of 
the old hierarchical relationships. 
The first pair of problems is more likely to be 
mentioned by the spontaneous co-ops and the second pair by 
the aided ones. It is possible that" the objective 
seriousness of these problems may not correspond to the 
seriousness with which they are perceived in the various 
co-ops. However, the problems co-ops say they have do not 
simply teli us about the different obstacles aided and 
spontaneous organizations think they have to face. They are 
also expressions of the logie which led to the setting-up 
and the history of those co-ops. Aided co-ops complain of 
the persistence of the old structures and of the fear of 
risk-taking. But it is precisely these factors which 
induced the members to come together to form a co-op; and 
so much is this true that the leaders are usually 
institutional-symbolic, and the start of operations has 
often been delayed by the fear of risk-taking. Even today, 
in these co-ops, it is fringe workers who carry out what 
little work is done. The cassintegrati (workers laid off by 

the core firms, who however, are not formally speaking 
unemployed but continue to be employees of the firm which 
pays them benefit) prefer to be involved solely in running 
the co-op, so as not to lose their benefit. It is difficult 
to see a solution for these co-ops within the narrow ambit 
which we have investigated: a satisfactory solution could 
only come from a broader policy as outlined in section 6 
which would encourage talent and opportunities for co-ops; 
and here results could only be obtained in the medium to 
long term. 
A dilemma which is no less acute, but is more 
fruitful, can be noticed in the three spontaneous co-ops 
which complain of the persistence of an unco-operative 
mentality. Considering where they started from and the 
results they have achieved, one might think that the 
declaration of these problems is more the result of 
perfectionist ambitions of their leaders than of genuine 
problems. But even if this is true on one level, it ignores 
the disquiet which leads to this sort of declaration. In 
our opinion this springs from unresolved tension between 
the two factors which led the members to commit themselves 
to a co-op as an alternative form of enterprise: the 
libertarian emphasis on safeguards for individuals, and the 
constraints imposed by the fact that collective 

co-operation is seen as a value in itself. This conflict is 
exorcised via an unrernitting effort to temper the excess of 
safeguards by an overdose of ethics and ideology. Frequent 
conflicts grow out of this situation, conflicts which the 
co-op then tries to smooth over via techniques which recali 
khadi justice. (Rotchild-Whitt makes a similar observatron 
a propos five Californian co-ops). Whatever the results 
obtained, this method satisfies members' desire to be 
protagonists of the decisione taken, and the co-existence 
of the two principles is ensured - as long as there is a 
continuai evocation of utopia to legitimate the profane 
choices in the everyday (6). 
The contradiction which ran the movement of the 
seventies, and which lies at the root of its defeat - the 
conflict between the opposition principle which led to 
libertarian law - breaking and overturning of rules in the 
short-term, and the principle of totality which exhorted a 
collective project with deferred gratification (Touraine 
1974) - stili has its effects today in the microcosm of the 
few co-ops born out of that defeat. But unlike then, when 
one stormed against some invisible and omnipotent boss, now 
it is the very people who have the contradiction inside 
them who have to decide how it is to be coped with in their 
own lives. 

But this is the dilemma on which every co-operative 
pact is founded. From here sprmgs the interest of research 
which, taking this dilemma as a postulate, sets out to 
study the differences in the emprrical solutions which are 
attempted on the way. 
Giuseppe Bonazzi 

N O T E S 
The co-ops we studied are as follows (field of activity, 
location of head office, and year of foundation also 
given): 
Agrovalli, land improvement, drainage, etc., 
Pinerolo, 1983 
COAP, consumer co-op, Turin, 1982 
- Educazione & Progetto, welfare for children, and 
social research, Turin, 1978 
Expocoop, erection and eguipping _of exhibition 
pavilions, Turin, 1984 
In/contro, social work with ex-drug addicts and the 
handicapped, Turin, 1982 
li margine, community and welfare services, 
Collegno, 1979 
IMP, land improvement, drainage, etc., Susa, 1983 
isotalco, manufacture heat resistant materials for 
electrical components, Pinerolo, 1984 
^ Brousse, manufacture electronic components, 
Ivrea, 1982 
La Nuova co-operativa, cleaning, Collegno, 1980 
Le Mani, handicrafts and cleaning, Turin, 1982 
Reme, hydraulic and electrical plant, Turin, 1982 
Socar, industriai engineering, Turin, 1984 
TIG, electrical and industriai plant, Turin, 1983 

- Vivere, welfare services for old people and the 
sick, Turin, 1985 
These co-ops share the fact of possessina « 
p^^sessing the economie 
and social features required to ask for special credit 
terms from the Region (as defined by the Piedmont 
regional law no. 28, of June 1984). There is no officiai 
record of the number of co-ops which qualify. m a 
preliminary search in the Region•s records and those of 
various organizations which encourage the establishment 
of co-ops, we found 57 co-ops which met the requirements 
in Piedmont as a whole, and of these 42 qperated in the 
province of Turin. These 42 co-ops thus make up the 
universe from which our sample of 16 was selected. We 
chose these 16 on the criteria of proportionality by 
sector in which activity was carried out, and by 
geographical location of head office. 
The method adopted in the research was that of recorded 
interview (following an introductory conversation) with 
the chairman of each co-op, and at least one other 
member of the management committee. 
In approximately half the cases, this information was 
supplemented by information obtained from the two 
co-op associations, trade unions, and various offices of 
the Regional administration. 
2) An in-depth investigation of these years has not yet 
been carried out. For an analysis which, although 

:s own drawing on the copious sources available, gives it 
interpretation of the dynamics in play, see C. Sabel, 
1982. Some hints on the orientations of the activists of 
those years come from as yet unfinished research 
undertaken by the present writer, on a sample of 138 
activists who took part in the "35 day struggle" at FIAT 
in 1980. One of the findings was that 39% of these 
people believed, at least for a time, that the struggles 
in the factories would turn into a victorious revolution 
in the streets, along the lines of the October 
Revolution; a further 31% thought that the strikes would 
bring substantial changes in Italian society, and only 
30% said they never thought the struggles in the 
factories could have had an effect on the politicai 
structure of the country (see Bonazzi, 1984). 
3) This judgement is based on the results - now accepted 
within organizational sociology - of the research done 
by the Aston University group see (Pugh and Hickson, 
1972 and 1977) . 
4) In terms of the schema proposed by S. Zan (1982) ali the 
co-ops in our sample had a "sandglass" type organization 
chart. This is easily explained as the result of their 
small size. 
5) One might however arrive at similar conclusions by way 
of motivational psychology, in particular Maslow's scale 
of needs. Nor should we ignore that line of thought 

which questions whether participation is of necessity a 
positive thing, and which suggests that increases in the 
freedom of members ought to be measured in terms of the 
increase in the guality of life, reduction in working 
hours, increase in free time, etc. (H. Desroche, 1972). 
6) We might cite a sentence from Weber here, which is full 
of resonance: "the more the religions character of the 
position of the kadi is accentuated, the more freely, 
within the unconstrained sphere of the sacred tradition, 
moves the free evaluation of the 
Economy and Society, Italian ed. voi. 
individuai case" 
2, pu 292. 

This article examines what fields of activity co-operatives 
engagé in, what the socral origina of their leaders are, 
how the leaders are legitimated, and the relatxon between 
economie success and internai democracy in a sample of 16 
co-operatives founded in the last few years by unemployed 
workers in the urban area in and around Turin. Spontaneous 
origin of co-operatives rather than aaded origin turns out 
to be the main factor in explaining better performance 
coupled with stronger internai democracy. However the past 
militance of members in politicai and union mobilrzation 
during the seventies, although it enhances internai 
democracy, is not sufficienti, by itself, to guarantee 
entrepreneurial success. To fulfill this aim, 
altruistically oriented but professional leaders are 
needed. 
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